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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN RE
PHIL L. HANSEN,

No. 15613

Appellant.

BRIEF OF THE UTAH STATE BAR

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a disciplinary action initiated by the Utah State
Bar against lawyer-appellant, Phil L. Hansen.

The Board of

Commissioners of the Utah State Bar has recommended to this
Court that appellant be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of one year.
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE UTAH STATE BAR
A complaint was lodged with the Utah State Bar on August
25, 1976 by Kay Lou Behunin alleging certain misconduct of her
attorney, Phil Hansen.

(Exhibit, hereinafter Ex. 20).

Appel-

lant was notified of these charges by the Bar and a hearing
was held before the Utah State Bar Screening Committee on October 28, 1976.

As a result of this hearing a complaint was

filed by the Chairman of the Screening Committee and served
upon Mr. Hansen on December 29, 1976.

The complaint charged

Hansen with violation of five specific disciplinary rules.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Hansen requested that the matter be remanded to the Screening
Committee on the grounds that he had not been afforded an opportunity to appear and present his defense.

This motion

was denied by the Trial Committee on January 24, 1977 and an
answer was filed by Mr. Hansen on February 15, 1977.

The de-

position of Hansen was taken on March 22, 1977 and the deposition of Kay Lou Behunin, the complainant, was taken on April
29, 1977.
A hearing was held before three members of the Utah State
Bar Commission on September 29, 1977.

On January 12, 1978 the

Panel issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recommending the suspension of appellant from the practice of
law in Utah for a period of one year.

The Utah State Bar

Board of Commissioners, after having reviewed the evidence
presented at the Panel hearing, recommended the adoption of
the Panel's recommendation and issued an Order recommending
suspension for one year.
Appellant was found to have violated Canon 5, DR5-105 and
Canon 2, DR2-106 of the Code of Ethics of the Utah State Bar.
Appellant filed his notice of appeal with this Court on
February 9, 1978.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Utah State Bar seeks aff irmance of the Findings and
Recommendations made by the Utah State Bar Board of CommisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sioners that appellant be suspended from the practice of law
in Utah for a period of one year.

In addition, the State Bar

would request that this Court order that Hansen refund the
fee paid to him by complainant less the reasonable value of
legal services performed and that Hansen be ordered to pay
costs of this prosecution to the Utah State Bar.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Utah State Bar does not agree with all of the characterizations and editorial comments made in appellant's Statement of Facts.

However, because those facts relating speci-

fically to procedure, the claim of conflict, and the excessive
fee claim will be dealt with separately in this brief an extensive review of the facts in this case would serve no useful
purpose at this point and therefore the following brief synopsis is offered.
This action was initiated on August 25, 1976 when a letter
was sent by Kay Lou Jenkins (as president of a car dealership)
alleging certain misconduct on the part of her attorney, Phil
Hansen.

(Ex. 20).

(It should be noted that all exhibits in

this case are attached either to the original deposition of
Phil L. Hansen or to the original transcript of the Disciplinary Hearing).
The letter of Mrs. Jenkins related several incidents and
facts which caused her concern.

In her letter she mentioned,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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among other things, that she had paid Mr. Hansen $5,000 to
represent her in the defense of a lawsuit, that she had difficulty in communicating with him, that she was extremely concerned that Hansen was simultaneously representing her in the
civil action while representing the man suing her in a criminal case, that he was not pursuing her case, and that she
would like some of her money back if Hansen didn't continue
to represent her.
After a hearing before the Disciplinary Screening Committee a complaint was issued by its chairman alleging violation
of five specific disciplinary rules of conduct.

An answer was

filed by Mr. Hansen denying these charges.
The deposition of Phil L. Hansen and Kay Lou Behunin
(formerly Kay Lou Jenkins) was taken prior to the Panel Hearing.
On September 29, 1977 a full hearing was held before three
members of the Utah State Bar Commission and evidence was presented.

At that time the prosecutors voluntarily dismissed two

charges against appellant.
The charges remaining against appellant were violation of
Disciplinary Rule 2-106
terest), and 1-102
of justice).

(excessive fee) , 5-101 (conflict of in-

(actions prejudicial to the administration

(Transcript of Disciplinary Hearing of September

29, 1977, hereinafter Tr., p. 3).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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At the hearing the following testimony was given.

Kay

Lou Behunin, the complainant, resided in Salina, Utah and was
married in 1975 to Randall Johnson.

(Tr., pp. 12-13).

John-

son at that time owned a Chevrolet dealership jointly with
Ted Burr.

Johnson subsequently bought up Burr's interest and

in November of 1975 Kay Lou divorced Johnson and purchased
the entire Chevrolet dealership.

(Tr., pp. 13-14).

In December of 1975 Ted Burr sued Kay Lou and Johnson
over alleged deficiencies in the accounting of the dealership
sale.

(Tr., p. 15).

lawsuit.

Kay Lou had never before been in a civil

(Tr . , p . 4 6 ) •

Kay Lou testified at the hearing that in December of
1975 she went to Phil Hansen's office with her bookkeeper and
business manager and presented him the complaint and several
documents pertaining to the lawsuit.

She testified that Han-

sen said he would take the case presuming she would immediately
deposit with him $5,000.

She testified that he informed her

that this money would be retained whether or not the case went
to trial.

(Tr. , p. 4 7) .

Hansen agreed with this testimony and added that at the
time he reviewed the initial pleadings he intended to file an
answer and a counterclaim for defamation.

(Tr., p. 53).

Han-

sen testified that the lawsuit was in the nature of breach of
contract that required more factual accounting tha~ legal preSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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paration.

(Tr., p. 54).

Both witnesses agreed that the ini-

tial meeting lasted only ten to fifteen minutes.
18

I

(Tr., pp.

52) •
Kay Lou testified that at the time of this meeting Mr.

Hansen did not inform her that the legal fee was non-returnable
regardless of what events transpired.

(Tr., pp. 17-18, 43).

No contract of employment was ever signed by Kay Lou reducing
the employment terms to writing.

(Tr., p. 42).

Hansen agreed

that no writing existed showing that the fee was nonrefundable
(Tr., p. 67) but claimed throughout the proceeding that the
nonrefundability was agreed upon by Kay Lou.
Kay Lou testified that she met with Hansen two weeks later in the presence of her bookkeeper and sent Hansen correspondence concerning the lawsuit during 1975 and through Septernber, 197 6.

(Tr., pp. 18-19).

She testified that David

Lord, an investigator for Hansen, interviewed her at Salina
for about 45 minutes and reviewed documents in her possession.
(Tr . , p . 2 0) .
The claim of conflict of interest arises from the fact
that appellant Hansen represented Ted Burr, the plaintiff in
Kay Lou's civil case, in a criminal defense at the same time
he continued to represent Kay Lou in the civil action.

It was

undisputed that Hans en represented both parties simultaneous l:·
and that both actions were filed in the 6th District Court of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the Honorable Don Tibbs.
However, there was a sharp conflict in the testimony between Hansen and Kay Lou as to how this dual representation
occurred and as to whether Kay Lou had given her informed consent of Hansen's representation of Burr.

This conflict of

testimony will be discussed infra in that portion of this
brief concerning the conflict of interest charge.
It was undisputed that the only documents filed in the
civil case on behalf of Kay Lou was an answer and counterclaim.
~o

depositions, interrogatories, or other discovery documents

had been prepared by Mr. Hansen during the two-year period of
representing Kay Lou.

Hansen testified it was his desire and

that of the other parties to pursue the criminal case first
and to postpone the civil case until after its completion.
(Tr. , pp. 9 0, 12 6) .
On August 25, 1976, approximately one month after Hansen
began the representation of Burr, Kay Lou wrote the initiating complaint to the Utah State Bar.

(Ex. 20).

Following

this complaint to the Bar, the Disciplinary Screening Committee was convened and after taking further testimony of the complainant issued the formal complaint against Hansen.

After dis-

covery by both parties, a Hearing Committee consisting of Richard H. Moffat,

o.

Wood Moyle, and David W. Sorenson conducted

an evidentiary hearing and recormnended that Hansen be suspended
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from the practice of law in Utah for one year based upon violation of two rules of discipline.

The Utah State Bar Com-

mission sitting as a whole reviewed these findings, reviewed
the evidence, and adopted the decision of the Hearing Committee.
It is from this recommendation of the Utah State Bar Commission that this appeal is taken.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT HANSEN WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN THE UTAH STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Before Hansen can prevail on this appeal this Court must
be convinced that the Utah State Bar Commission has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably.
P.2d 1273 (Utah 1972).

In Re Badger, 493

The findings of the Board of Commis-

sioners must be accepted as facts of the case unless it appears that the Board has acted capriciously or arbitrarily or
went beyond its powers.

In Re Wade, 497 P.2d 22 (Utah 1972).

It is the burden of Hansen upon review of a recommendation of the Utah State Bar Commission to show that the Board's
recommendations were erroneous or unlawful.
Bar, 521 P.2d 858

(Cal. 1974).

Yokozeki v. State

A disciplinary proceeding be-

fore the State Bar is sui generis.

Neither civil nor criminal

in character since the purpose of the proceeding is not to pur.ish the individual attorney, or to determine whether the atSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

torney is guilty of a crime, but to determine whether the attorney should be allowed to continue the practice of law and
the principal objective of the proceeding is to protect the
courts, the legal profession, and the public from persons unfit to practice law.

The standard of proof in such cases is

clear and convincing evidence.

McComb v. Commission on Judi-

cial Performance, 564 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1977).
Hansen in his brief argues that he had been denied due
process of law during the disciplinary proceedings in four
respects:

first,

that he was not given ample opportunity to

be present at the Disciplinary Screening Committee Hearing
(Appellant's brief, pp. 12-13); second, that he was not given
sufficient notice nor were the pleadings properly framed as
to the violation of DR5-105 concerning the conflict of interest charge

(Appellant's brief, pp. 18-30); third, that Han-

sen was not given sufficient notice nor charged properly with
violation of DR2-106 concerning excessive fees

(Appellant's

brief, pp. 30-34); and fourth, that the Board of Commissioners
did not base its Order on proper evidence (Appellant's brief,
pp. 34-35).

A review of the record in this case clearly shows

that each of Hansen's contentions is without merit.
A.
Hansen was Given Ample Opportunity to be Present at
the Disciplinary Screening Committee.
Hansen in his brief argues that he was not given suff i·.~ ien t

notice of the Screening Committee Hearing on October 28,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1976 and that, in any case, the charges made by the Committee
went beyond the allegations contained in Kay Lou's letter.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 12-14).

Both arguments are erroneous.

The letter signed by Kay Lou Jenkins and addressed to
the Utah State Bar was dated August 25, 1976.

(Ex. 20).

On

September 2, 1976 Dean Sheffield sent a letter to Hansen with
a copy of the Kay Lou Jenkins' letter enclosed.
that a response be made within ten days.

He requested

(Ex. 1).

On Sep-

tember 24 a second letter was addressed to Hansen stating that
no response to the first letter had been received and advising
him that an answer must be made within ten days.
copy of the original letter was enclosed.

Again, a

(Ex. 2).

Finally, on October 26, 1976 Sheffield wrote to Hansen
informing him that no response had been received as to the
September 24 letter and that a hearing was to be held on Octaber 28 before _the Disciplinary Screening Committee.

(Ex. 3).

Hansen in his deposition admitted receiving all of these letters prior to the Disciplinary Screening Committee Hearing.
(Deposition of Phil Hansen, March 22, 1977, hereinafter Hansen
Depo., p. 6).
Hansen claimed that he sent a letter to Sheffield on September 20, 1976 but the correspondence from Sheffield stating
that no response had been received indicates that such letter
did not reach the Utah State Bar.

Certainly, Mr. Hansen upon

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I

_...,,,..,

receiving the September 24 letter had adequate notice that
his September 20 letter had not been received and should have
taken some affirmative action in such an important matter.
Thus, Hansen had adequate notice of the Disciplinary Screening Committee Hearing and failed through his own actions to
attend such meeting.
Rule I of the Revised Rules of Discipline of the Utah
State Bar required that a complaining client give a "full and
complete statement of the facts upon which the accusation is
based" to the State Bar.

It does not require the complaining

client to specifically allege violations of ethical canons.
Hansen would seem to argue that before a valid charge could
be made against a lawyer the client must determine what violations of the ethical rules have occurred.

Such an interpreta-

tion is unfounded.
The letter of Kay Lou stated that she paid Hansen a $5,000
retaining fee, that he had undertaken the defense of Ted Burr,
that he had not contacted her concerning the preparation of her
case, that she expected to pay Hansen for any work he had performed but could not believe he had done anything to prepare
the case, and that she was greatly concerned about the conflict
of interest between Burr and herself.

(Ex. 20).

Certainly these facts were sufficient to apprise Hansen
of Kay Lou's claim of a conflict and of her concern over the
:~e

which had been paid to him.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A preliminary investigation of a State Bar Association
is merely for the purpose of deciding whether formal charges
should be brought.
1951).

Hogan v. State Bar, 228 P.2d 554

(Cal.

It is the function of the Screening Committee to sift

out the facts of a lawyer's representation of a client and to
determine if a violation of ethical standards has occurred.
If a client is unhappy with a lawyer's conduct the client has
the opportunity to tell the full story to the Screening Committee for its determination whether such conduct constituted
a violation of ethical standards.

It is not the function of

the client to decide beforehand what violations had occurred
since in most cases the client will not know the intricate
rules and regulations concerning a lawyer's conduct.
Hansen was not denied due process as to the opportunity
to attend the Screening Committee hearing nor as to the subject matter of the hearing.
B.
Hansen Has Not Been Deprived Due Process Concerning
the Charges of Violating DR5-105.
The Utah State Bar will readily admit that the initial
complaint filed in this action by the Screening Committee erroneously referred to DRS-101 rather than DRS-105.

This mis-

take was caused either by a typographical error or by inadvertence on the part of the Screening Committee since both sections involve a conflict of interest.
This mistake, however, is hardly worthy of twelve pages
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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I

__.,,,.,

of Hansen's brief and the extensive claims and charges made
within those pages.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 18-30).

There

can be no doubt from a review of this record that Hansen, his
attorney, the Utah State Bar prosecutors, the Hearing Committee, and the Utah State Bar Commission all were aware that
the substance of Section 5-105 was being alleged and for Hansen to claim, "He was never given notice of the charge with
which he was ultimately convicted"

(Appellant's brief, p. 19)

is simply not true.
The initiating complaint of Kay Lou Jenkins clearly stated her concern with the conflict between Hansen's representation of her and Mr. Burr.

She stated, "I feel there is con-

flict of interest in the behalf of Mr. Hansen".

(Ex.

20).

Hansen's letter to the State Bar dated November 11, 1976
also speaks in terms of the dual representation of Burr and
Kay Lou and states, "She consented that I could represent Mr.
Burr in his criminal case and continue to represent her in the
civil case".

Hansen then quotes DR5-105(C) which states that

a lawyer may represent multiple clients if he can adequately
represent their interests and if each consents to the representat ion.

(Ex.

6).

A portion of the formal complaint filed against Hansen
states the following:
That during the pendency of the Civil Proceedings aforesaid in which he had conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tracted to represent the complainant, the
aforesaid Phil L. Hansen, undertook the defense of Ted Burr in a criminal proceeding
without the knowledge or consent of the
complainant, that he intimated to her that
his handling of the criminal proceeding
could be of assistance of them in her lawsuit.
Hansen in his answer denied any violation of the Canon
of Ethics and affirmatively alleged that his conduct "is
squarely within the terms of DR5-105(C)" and then stated the
rule once again that a lawyer may represent multiple clients
if he can adequately represent the interests of each and if
each consents to the representation.
In his deposition Hansen stated:
because of the Canon of Ethics that I

"I wanted her consent
cited in my letter to

the Bar about consent of both parties."

(Hansen Depa., p. 36).

At the hearing itself Hansen stated he realized at the
time the importance of getting Kay Lou's consent before he
could represent Burr and again cited DR5-105(C).

(Tr., pp.

82-83, 116).

For Hansen now to complain in this appeal that he had no
notice of the charge against him concerning this conflict is
truly incredible.
It is difficult, for example, to understand how Hansen
did not have notice of the correct 5-105 provision when he specifically and repeatedly referred to the affirmative defense
of 5-lOS(C)

in his answer and throughout

t~e

~roceedings.
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DR5-105(C) specifically states the following:
In the situations covered by DR5-105(A) and
a lawyer may represent multiple clients
if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each
consents to the representation after full
disclosure of the possible effect of such
representation on the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of
each.
(Emphasis added).
~'

If Hansen truly believed he was being charged under 5-101 why
would he repeatedly refer to 5-105(C) which is by its own
terms limited solely to 5-105

(A) and (B)?

Hansen's attempt to exploit the initial mistake in the
complaint can only be deemed as a last desperate effort to
avoid the substance of the charge itself.

However, for the

sake of argument Hansen's claim of lack of due process is
without merit even assuming that the initial mistake in the
complaint was not corrected by Hansen's obvious notice of the
correct charge and his failure to object to it throughout the
proceedings.
Disciplinary proceedings before a State Bar are technically neither civil nor criminal in character.

McComb v. Corn-

mission on Judicial Performance, 564 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1977).

A

disciplinary proceeding is an internal action conducted by a
State Bar Association and the State's highest court to determine if a lawyer should remain as an officer of the court.
such, it is governed by its own rules as supplemented by the
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As

Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under any standard Hansen has not been denied due process.

Had this been a criminal offense Section 77-21-8,

U.C.A. would have required that the offense be stated sufficiently to "give the court and the defendant notice of what
offense was intended to be charged".

Paragraph 4 of subdivi-

sion III clearly sets out the facts going to the conflict of
interest charge and the language following the erroneous DRS101 further states:
In that he has undertaken employment interests adverse or in conflict with the
interests of his client.
Such complaint clearly gave Hansen notice of the charge against
him especially when read in light with the initiating letter of
Kay Lou Jenkins.
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure Hansen's failure to
object at the time of hearing to the erroneous citation waived
any right to object and allowed an amendment to be made to
conform to the evidence.

The Supreme Court of New Mexico clear-

ly stated this rule when it said:
It is true that the complaint of the Grievance Committee failed to allege respondent's
wrongful retention of monies dispersed for
insurance premiums.
This court has held that,
in the absence of any objection to evidence
on issues raised by the pleadings, the party
failing to object has impliedly consented to
the amendment of the pleadings to conform to
the evidence..
.The record does not indicate
that respondent offered any objection to the
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evidence brought out in the testimony of
several witnesses concerning the retention of insurance premium money.
Respondent cross-examined the witness concerning the premium money and, in his final
statement to the Commission, made reference
to the money.
We hold that respondent impliedly consented
to the amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evidence adduced at the hearing and respondent's contention is without
merit.
In Re Sedillo, 498 P.2d 1353 (N.M.
1972).
Here, Hansen made no objection to the erroneous section number, testified as to the consent given by Kay Lou, and crossexamined Kay Lou as to this consent.

Under Rule 15(b) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure an amendment has been made to
conform to the evidence since no prejudice has been shown by
Hansen and this Court should so hold.
Glezos, 310 P.2d 517

Buehner Block Co. v.

(1966).

Finally, as to Bar proceedings themselves it is universally held that as long as sufficient facts are alleged against
an attorney he is put on notice as to any violation of the Canon of Ethics since "It is encumbent on every attorney to
know the disciplinary rules regulating his profession."

State

v. Turner, 538 P.2d 966 (Kan. 1975); In Re Kellar, 493 P.2d
1039 (Nev. 1972); In Re Lenske, 523 P.2d 1262 (Or. 1974).
The cases cited by Hansen in support of his due process
~rgurnent

are not applicable to the instant case.

These cases

involve instances where attorneys were not formally charged,
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where amendments were made during the Bar proceedings different from the original complaint, or where no hearing at
all was held.
p. 21)

In the Ruffalo case cited by appellant

(brief,

an amendment to the original charges was made on the

second day of Bar Commission hearings with no prior notice
that such a charge was being considered.
In the Evans case (Appellant's brief, p. 23)

the original

complaint had no correlation either factually nor legally with
the ultimate charge issued against the lawyers.

This case in-

volved prior procedure before the present Rules of Discipline
were established.
In the Oliver case (Appellant's brief, p. 24) the lawyer
was given no opportunity for a hearing to answer the charges
against him and the matter was remanded to the Bar Association
for further consideration.

In the Foster case (Appellant's

brief, p. 25) the court required that the charges be filed in
writing, that notice of the charges be given, and that a hearing be held as to the charges.
Finally, in the Berkley case,

(Appellant's brief, p. 27)

the lawyers were charged with soliciting and advertising but
were ultimately convicted of completely separate charges.
Hansen was not denied due process in the conflict of interest charge and to make such a claim can only illustrate
the weakness of his position on this appeal.
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C.
Hansen Was Not Denied Due Process of Law Concerning
the Violation of DR2-106.
Hansen complains in his brief that except for the allegation in the complaint that he had charged a fee that was
clearly excessive he had no notice prior to the formal hearing "of any charge that the fee in question was excessive or,
for that matter, improper for any other reason".
brief, p. 30).

(Appellant's

He then complains that the initial letter of

Kay Lou Jenkins failed to advise him of any problem with his
fee and finally concludes that he was given no opportunity to
present any defense to the Screening Committee.

Hansen's com-

plaints are not justified by the record in this case.
The letter of Kay Lou Jenkins stated that she had paid
Hansen $5,000 and further stated that she expected to pay Hansen for any services he had performed but did not believe he
had done anything to prepare the case.

(Ex. 20).

In the second week of September prior to the Screening
Committee hearing Kay Lou met with Phil Hansen and discussed
his continued employment of the case.
for a refund of her retainer fee.

At that time she asked

Hansen was obviously aware

of her desire for a refund since in his letter of October 1,
1976 to Kay Lou Jenkins he wrote the following:
You will remember that my nonrefundable fee
of $5,000 was the amount upon which we agreed
as payment in full for all necessary preparation and court appearances through trial,
if necessary, and also if the matter were
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settled before trial.
In your letter to the Utah State Bar Association, you indicated that you were willing to pay for the services I had rendered
thus far but insinuated that if you were to
substitute counsel that a refund would be
expected. This is contrary to our initial
agreement relative to the fact that I would
not charge you on a piecemeal basis or an
hourly rate, but that the $5,000 fee was
for win, lose, or draw, at any stage of the
completion of your case through trial, if
necessary, from the date of your contracting with me to represent you.
(Ex. 5).
(Emphasis added).
Thus, Hansen knew from the letter and from his own conversations with Kay Lou that she was concerned about not receiving
her money back if she was to hire another lawyer.
In addition, the question of the refundability of the
fee and the basis upon which Hansen sets a fee was extensively
gone into during his deposition.

(Hansen Depa., pp. 22-29).

It is obvious from reading this testimony that all facets of
his fee arrangement were examined and he was repeatedly asked
to justify the $5,000 fee which he had charged Kay Lou.
Adequate notice of the general charge of excessive fee
was clearly given by the complaint.

DR2-106 is the only ethi-

cal standard relating to the amount and structure of a fee.
It advised Hansen that the flat fee was being challenged as
to the basis of the original demand and as to the work that
was actually performed based upon that fee.

In other words,

while $5,000 may have been reasonable if the matter went to
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trial it would be completely unreasonable if the client wished
to terminate the lawyer and only five hours of work had been
done.

Hansen completely ignores paragraph 4 of Rule V of the

Revised Rules of Discipline of the Utah State Bar which states:
"Depositions and discovery may be held and conducted in accordance with Rules 26 to 37 inclusive of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure."

If Hansen was not satisfied with the spe-

cifics of the initial charge he certainly could have sent interrogatories or conducted other discovery proceedings to
satisfy his desire.

No discovery was undertaken by Hansen,

however, in this respect since, once again, Hansen as well as
all of the other parties concerned were aware of the charges
concerning his fee structure.
During the hearing Hansen's counsel questioned Kay Lou
specifically about the refund issue.

(Tr., p. 33).

Hansen

was asked by the prosecutor as to his arrangement with Kay Lou
regarding the refundability of the fee and Hansen went into
elaborate detail as to his understanding with her.
62, 66-68).

(Tr., pp.

Subsequently Commissioner Sorenson asked Hansen

whether he would refund the money to Kay Lou and he replied
that he did not believe he had any legal obligation to do so
and that he did not think he should be dictated to by the Bar
or Kay Lou as to how much that should be.

(Tr., p. 118).

no time during the proceedings did Hansen object that the
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At

question of refund was not properly plead.

Accordingly, any

such claim has been waived and cannot be raised at this time.
In Re Sedillo, 498 P.2d 1353 (N.M. 1972).
Hansen was not denied due process of law in the charge
of violating DR2-106.

Throughout the proceedings he had ade-

quate notice that both the amount of his fee and the structure of his fee was being scrutinized and examined by the
Utah State Bar and because of this knowledge did not offer
any objection to the testimony at the hearing.

This claim

of due process can only be termed as a smokescreen attempt
to divert this Court from an examination of the substance of
the charge.
D.
The Board of Commissioners Based its Order on Proper
Evidence and Proper Procedure.
Appellant Hansen argues in his brief that the Utah State
Bar Commission did not properly review the evidence introduced in this case but merely rubber-stamped the findings of
the Hearing Committee.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 34-35).

Of all of Hansen's claims this is the most brazen.

How

can appellant Hansen make statements such as "The most that
can be said is that the full Bar Commission met and listened
to the three commissioners who constituted the Hearing Committee.

.and then adopted as its own the evidentiary findings

of the

[Committee] without any independent examination of a

single piece of evidence"?

The Court will note that there is
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no record as to what transpired at the Board of Corrunissioners'
meeting and Hansen's statement as to what went on is pure and
simple speculation on his part.
Hansen's apparent factual statements concerning this
failure are typical of his asserted statements throughout his
brief which are equally unsupported by the record.

It is

clearly surprising that Hansen would make such an attack upon
the distinguished members of the Utah State Board of Comrnissioners without some evidentiary basis for his accusation.
This claim of procedural infirmity together with the
other claims must fall.

Hansen was clearly not denied due

process of law as to any of the charges made against him as
is amply demonstrated by the exhibits and record in this case.
His claim of due process deficiency must be deemed as an attempt to camouflage the substantive issues of this case.
POINT II
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW FILED BY THE HEARING COMMITTEE AND
APPROVED BY THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF
THE UTAH STATE BAR ARE SUPPORTED BY PROPER EVIDENCE AND ARE NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS.
Although the action of the Utah State Bar Comrnission is
only a recommendation upon which this Court may act, this Court
has held repeatedly that it will presume the action of the Bar
to be correct and proper and will not change it unless the Corn1ission has acted capriciously, arbitrarily, or beyond the
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scope of its powers.

In Re Johnston,

524 P.2d 593 (Utah 1974).

This Court has also stated that it will not lightly disregard
the unanimous conclusions reached by those appointed to seek
out the facts unless they have misconceived the nature of the
relationship between counsel, client, and the court, or have
misinterpreted the facts.

In Re King, 322 P.2d 1095 (Utah

1968).
Hansen asserts that the recommendation of the Board of
Commissioners "is unreasonable and excessive."

He states, "It

reflects prejudice and jealousy" and not concern with any danger to the public caused by his conduct.
p. 49).

(Emphasis added) .

(Appellant's brief,

Such statement again illustrates

Hansen's unsupportable position since he finds it necessary to
repeatedly attack the members of the Utah State Bar Commission
rather than the merits of his case.

This statement also illus-

trates Hansen's attitude throughout these proceedings that he
is somehow above all other lawyers and is entitled to do anything he desires.

His claim that Commissioners Lee, Beaslin,

Frandsen, Gould, Hansen, Kipp, Moffat, Moyle, and Sorenson are
"jealous" needs no further comment.
The Utah State Bar Commission and its committee have carefully considered the case against Hansen as evidenced by the
diminuation of charges initially made against him.

The compl3i:

in this case charged Hansen with violation of five specific
ciplinary
At Funding
the fortime
of the
hearing
Utah State
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Bar prosecutors moved to dismiss two of these charges and such
dismissal was granted by the Hearing Committee.

(Tr. , p. 3) •

The final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by the
Hearing Committee concerned the violation only of DR5-105 and
2-106--disrnissing the charge under 1-102(5).

This process of

elimination of charges shows without question that the Bar Cornmission acted honestly and prudently in sifting the evidence
and weighing it with the disciplinary standards established by
this Court.
Hansen attacks the findings and conclusions of the Bar
Committee as not supported by the evidence.

In most cases,

however, Hansen cites evidence most favorable to himself and
ignores conflicting evidence which the Bar Commission accepted as true.

The following review of the Record and the find-

ings entered by the Bar Commission amply support the Comrnission's recommendation to suspend Hansen for one year from practicing law in Utah.
A.
The Bar Commission was Correct in Finding that Hansen
had Violated DR5-105 in that he Represented Two Conflicting
Clients Simultaneously Without Obtaining the Consent of One
Client and with No Showing That the Clients were Informed as to
the Conflict.
Disciplinary Rule 5-105 states the following:
DR5-105 Refusing to Accept or Continue Employment if the Interests of Another Client May
Impair the Independent Professional Judgment
of the Lawyer.
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A.
A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of a client
will be or is likely to be adversely af fected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, except to the extent permitted under DRS-105 (c).
B.
A lawyer shall not continue multiple
employment if the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of a client
will be or is likely to be adversely affected
by his representation of another client, except to the extent permitted under DR5-105(c).
C.
In the situations covered by DR5-105(A)
and (B), a lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately
represent the interest of each and if each
consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent
professional judgment on behalf of each.
It should be noted at the offset that there is no question that Hansen represented Ted Burr in the criminal case
simultaneously with representing Kay Lou in the civil case.

It

also should be noted that Hansen himself admitted that be believed it was necessary to obtain the consent of Kay Lou before
he could represent Ted Burr.

(Tr., pp. 82-83).

Thus, it can

be assumed without question that Hansen represented multiple
clients in a situation which his independent professional judgment would be or would likely be adversely affected by his representation of another client.

The sole question is whether

Kay Lou had consented to this dual representation and whether
Hansen had given full disclosure to her of the possible effect
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of such representation as is required by DR5-105(C) which Hansen repeatedly relied upon as his defense.
It should also be noted at this point that while Hansen
attacks the findings of the Bar Commission for referring to
Kay Lou Behunin as an individual rather than a corporation
(Appellant's brief, pp. 37-40) such distinction is irrelevant.
First, Kay Lou is the sole stockholder of the corporation (Tr.,
p. 13) and secondly even Hansen admitted himself that the complaint attacked Kay Lou personally as well as the corporation.
(Tr., p. 112).

Hansen's extensive attack upon this "error"

again illustrates his preoccupation with form over substance.
The following is a review of the Findings of Fact issued
by the Bar Commission which are relevant to the question of
conflict and a brief discussion of each finding with reference
to the evidence introduced at the hearing:
(3)
That Kay Lou Behunin, also known as Kay Lou Johnson
Wheeler, resided in Salina, Utah and was married in 1975 to
Randall Johnson.
That Johnson at that time owned a Chevrolet
dealership jointly with Ted Burr. Johnson subsequently bought
out Burr's interest, and in November of 1975 Mrs. Behunin di'1orced Johnson and purchased the entire Chevrolet dealership.
This finding is undisputed by Hansen.
(4)
That in the latter part of 1975 Ted Burr sued Mrs.
Behunin and Mr. Johnson over alleged deficiencies in the accounting of the dealership's sale.
That prior to that time Mrs.
Behunin had never been involved in civil litigation other than
divorce proceedings.
Hansen questions this finding by stating that the inference is
t~at Kay Lou was a naive,

unsophisticated, ill-equipped indivi-
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dual to strike a fair bargain with a lawyer.
brief, p. 37).

(Appellant's

Hansen then states that since she was presi-

dent and sole stockholder of this corporation she obviously
was a sophisticated business person who ought to have known
whether or not she was getting a good bargain.

Hansen's state-

ment, like many others, is his opinion and speculation.

It

can just as easily be said that the fact a person is a good
business man or woman does not mean they are familiar with the
cost and procedures of litigation.
(15) That during the summer of 1976 .Mr. Burr was charged
in the District Court of Sevier County, which was the same
court in which Mr. Burr had sued Mrs. Behunin and that after
being charged with a felony Mr. Burr requested that respondent
represent him as defense counsel.
There is no dispute as to the accuracy of this finding.

The

fact that the suit was to take place in the same court in a
small town compounded the representation by Hansen of both clients as was thoroughly discussed in the hearing.

(Tr., pp. 94-

95, 129-130).
(16) That after being contacted by Mr. Burr, the respondent advised Mrs. Behunin that he was representing or intended
to represent Mr. Burr, and Mrs. Behunin advised respondent that
this was contrary to her wishes.
This finding as to the consent of Mrs. Behunin was the gravamen
of the hearing concerning the conflict of interest.

Kay Lou

testified that in June or July of 1976 she contacted Hansen at
the Helper Club in Carbon County.

(Tr., pp. 20-21).

Accord-

ing to her testimony Hansen called her and requested that he
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,c<:c

her about the case.

She testified that she met him at the

Helper Club in a back bar room and that he requested she accompany him to a motel to discuss the business.

(Tr. , p. 2 2) •

She informed him she did not want to discuss any business in

a

~otel

room and asked what he wanted.

She then testified he

informed her he had been contacted by Ted Burr, plaintiff in
the suit filed against her, and that he was considering re presen ting him in his criminal defense.

(Tr., p. 22) •

Kay Lou testified she knew Burr had been charged because
she had read about it in a newspaper and was familiar with the
charges from hearsay in the town.

(Tr., pp. 22-35).

She tes-

tified at the time she told Hansen she was afraid the legal
charges involved transactions of the dealership and that she
was afraid some of the dealership's property was involved.
(Tr., pp. 22-26).

She also told Hansen she did not want to

be connected with the situation at all and that she did not
want Hansen to have her records which were vital to her case.
She testified she was afraid that Burr may receive some information through Hansen.

(Tr., p. 26).

She testified that Han-

sen told her he hadn't decided to take the case but would advise her of his decision that night.

(Tr., p. Z6) •

She testified that that night he subsequently called her
and said he would not take the Burr case.

She stated that

this was good and it was a great relief to her.

(Tr . , p . 2 7 ) .

Kay Lou testified that shortly thereafter she heard by
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word-of-mouth that Hansen had indeed taken the Burr case.
(Tr., p. 28).

She then tried many times to contact Hansen and

tell him that she was dissatisfied about him taking the case
but he never returned her calls.

Subsequently, approximately

one month after her orig in al conversation with Hansen concerninc
Burr she wrote the initiating letter to the Utah State Bar complaining of this conflict.

(Ex.

20).

Ten days after the Bar notified Hansen of the complaint
she met with Hansen and "made it very clear that I had not
told him it was all right" to defend Ted Burr.

(Tr., p. 32).

He told her to think it over awhile and to talk it over.

(Tr.,

p. 33).

Hansen testified that he met Kay Lou at the Helper Club
at her insistence and that it was only for the purpose of being advised about the criminal charge pending against Burr.
He stated that he had not even known Burr at that time.

(Tr.,

pp. 73-75).
Hansen testified that later he was contacted by Burr and
told him that he could not represent Burr unless he received
the approval of Kay Lou.

(Tr., p. 82).

He accordingly called

her and she agreed to the dual representation.

(Tr., p. 82).

He admitted at the hearing that he had no documentary evidence
showing her consent or no other witnesses to verify that her
consent was given.

(Tr.,

p. 8 5) •
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(17) That the respondent undertook the representation of
Mr. Burr while at the same time representing Mrs. Behunin in
the civil action filed against her by Mr. Burr.
This finding is also undisputed.

Hansen represented Burr from

the summer of 1976 to the time of the hearing before the Panel.
Shortly before the hearing Burr was convicted of five counts
of receiving stolen property.

(Tr., p. 70).

Hansen was still

representing Burr on the appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.
Hansen's employment with Kay Lou was terminated in October of
1976 (according to Kay Lou's testimony;

(Tr., p. 33, Ex. 15)

or February of 1977 according to Hansen's testimony (Tr., p. 89,
Ex. 5, Appellant's brief, p. 29).
(18) That the respondent did not obtain the permission of
Mrs. Behunin to represent Mr. Burr and that after Mrs. Behunin
learned of the respondent's representation of Mr. Burr, she
filed a written complaint with the Utah State Bar.
The question of permission has been discussed previously under
Finding 16.
The following two conclusions were made by the Screening
Committee and subsequently adopted by the Board of Commissioners.
1.
That the conduct of the respondent violates Rule 4,
Canon 5, DR5-105, in that the undertaking by respondent of the
representation of Ted Burr prevented the respondent from exercising independent professional judgment in behalf of his client, Mrs. Behunin, or was likely to so impair his professional
judgment.
Kay Lou testified that she was concerned about Hansen's representation of Burr because of the possible involvement of the
~ealership

in the fraudulent transaction since there were ques-
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tions raised by the authorities whether some of the items involved in the criminal case had been purchased through the
dealership.

In addition, Burr had an office at Kay Lou's dea-

lership and she felt uneasy about the dual representation.
(Tr., p. 26).

Hansen testified that the two cases were com-

pletely dissimilar although he admitted that later he discovered dealership typewriters had been turned over by Kay Lou
to the police (Tr., p. 99) and that Burr was charged with possession of a gun he owned during the time of his involvement
in the Chevrolet corporation.

(Tr . , p • 9 2 ) •

Innumerable conflicts are apparent from a dual representation by Hansen of the two clients.

If, for example, Hansen

failed to properly prepare Burr's defense and Burr was convicted of the felony, Hansen could then impeach Burr in the civil
case for the felony conviction which could be attributable to
Hansen's own efforts.

(Tr., p. 102).

Hansen admitted he told

Kay Lou that Burr's credibility "wouldn't be too hot" if he
were convicted.

The delay in the civil case was obviously

caused by Hansen's reluctance to depose Burr at the same time
he was representing him.

(Tr • , p . 1 0 3 ) .

Other conflicts are also apparent.,

Hansen could have

learned of facts from either client during his representation
which may have been pertinent to the defense or prosecution of
the other's case.

Hansen denied disclosing any confidences to
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either client but he certainly could not deny the opportunity
nor the appearance of impropriety in the dual representation.
Hansen may have been forced to pursue Burr to collect a money
judgment obtained in a civil case while at the same time appealing his conviction in the criminal case.
These facts together with the testimony at the hearing
show that Hansen could not possibly represent both clients
effectively without an impairment of his professional judgment
and without the appearance of a severe conflict.
2.
That the respondent continued in the employ of both
Mr. Burr and Mrs. Behunin, even though his independent professional judgment was or was likely to have been adversely
affected or impaired, notwithstanding Mrs. Behunin advising
the respondent that she did not want the respondent to represent Mr. Burr while the respondent was representing her.
As has been previously discussed Kay Lou testified repeatedly
that she informed Hansen she did not want him to represent Burr.
(Tr., pp. 26, 27, 30, 32).

There certainly is no doubt from

the August 25, 1976 letter to the Bar that Kay Lou did not want
this dual representation.

(Ex.

20).

After learning of Kay Lou's dissatisfaction with his dual
representation Hansen never informed Kay Lou that he would not
represent Burr.

He told her during the September conference

to think it over as to whether he could continue the dual representation.

According to his letter of October 1, 1976 it

was agreed between himself and Kay Lou that she would contact
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fense.

(Ex. 5).

Hansen, therefore, neither obtained Kay Lou's

initial permission to represent Burr nor agreed to drop that
case upon her complaint.

He continued to keep her money, how-

ever, even after she informed him that she did not want this
dual representation and had obtained another lawyer.
This review of the findings by the Commission shows that
they were based upon substantial evidence and were not made arbitrarily or capriciously.
It is undisputed that Hansen represented both Burr and Kay
Lou concurrently.

This concurrent representation created both

an actual conflict upon Hansen and an appearance of impropriety.
DR5-105 assumes that a lawyer will not represent multiclients unless provision (C) has been complied with.

This pro-

vision requires that if it is obvious a lawyer can represent
the interests of each party then each person must consent to
the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect
of such conflict.

Hansen recognizes affirmative defense of con

sent in paragraph 6 of his answer and during the hearing.

(Tr.

p. 16).

The burden is upon Hansen to show that all clients involve
were properly informed of any possible conflict and gave their
consent.

See Clancy v. State Bar of California, 454 P.2d 329

(Cal. 1969).

There was a sharp dispute in the testimony betwee

Hansen and Kay Lou concerning the representation of Burr.
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Ka~

Lou consistently stated that she never approved such representation because of her fears the business would be involved in
the criminal case and for a number of other reasons.

She wrote

the letter to the State Bar complaining of this dual representation within one month after Hansen elected to take the Burr
case.
Hansen denies Kay Lou's failure to consent but has no documentation or independent witnesses substantiating his claim.
He also produced no evidence that Ted Burr approved of the
dual representation.

Thus, the credibility of the witnesses

was sharply at issue and it was up for the trier of fact, in
this case the Hearing Committee, to weigh the credibility of
the witnesses.
Hansen argued throughout the proceedings that the cases were
completely unrelated and therefore no conflict existed.

It was

shown, however, that certain typewriters turned over to the authorities by Kay Lou were in the possession of the dealership
and had some link to Burr's previous illegal activity.
99).

(Tr., p.

Likewise, the gun mentioned during the hearing also in-

volved the same period of time.

(Tr., p. 92).

The fact that

the authorities examined Kay Lou's records and inventory at the
dealership again revealed at least the appearance of some connection between the dealership and Burr's criminal activity.
!Tr., p. 25).
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But even without an actual conflict between the two cases
there still remains an apparent credibility conflict in the
dual representation.

Hansen was defending Kay Lou in a suit

where she was charged with failing to properly pay Ted Burr
the money owing to him.

In the counterclaim Hansen alleged

that Burr was untruthful in making defamatory statements against
Kay Lou and the dealership.

(Tr., p. 112).

Obviously, Hansen

had to attack the credibility of Burr to succeed in the defense
and counterclaim of the civil suit.
At the same time, however, Hansen had to defend Burr on
criminal charges attacking the accusations of the State that
Burr was dishonest.

To compound matters both cases were filed

in a small town or county where the jury could not help but
know of the dual representation.
The cases are obviously factually connected and even if
they were not the Canons of Ethics allow such dual representation only in extreme cases where the clients are fully informed of the potential conflicts.

Here, there was no evidence

that Burr was ever informed of the conflict and certainly no
evidence that Kay Lou was told all of the ramifications of such
a dual representation even if it were assumed that she did in
fact give her consent.
An examination of similar cases in other states supports
Hansen's violation of the Professional Code.

In Grievance Com-
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mittee of the Bar of Hartford County v. Rottner, 203 A.2d 82
(Conn. 1964) a law firm represented a client in several minor
collection cases for a period of years.

While still maintain-

ing the collection actions the law firm instituted a suit
against the client for assault and battery and sought to execute on the client's house.

The lawyers vehemently maintained

that they did not violate any ethical code since the two cases
had nothing in common.
jected this contention.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut reIn supporting the lower court's deci-

sion the Supreme Court stated:
The Court found such violations to exist
even apart from any consideration of the
existence of a conflict of interest.
In
other words the Court concluded that a firm
may not accept any action against a person
who they are presently representing even
though there is no relationship between the
two cases.
In arriving at this conclusion
the Court cited an opinion of the Committee
on Professional Ethics of the New York County Lawyer's Association which stated in
part:
"While under the circumstances. . .
maintenance of public confidence in the Bar
requires an attorney to decline, while representing such client, any employment from
an adverse party in any matter even though
wholly unrelated to the original retainer."
Id. at 84.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut succinctly stated the
reasons why ~r. Hansen should not have represented both Mr.
Burr and Kay Lou concurrently.

The Court stated:

We feel this rule should be rigidly followed by the legal profession. When a client
engages the services of a lawyer in a giSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ven piece of business he is entitled to
feel that, until that business is finally
disposed of in some manner, he has the undivided loyalty of the one upon whom he
looks as his advocate and his champion.
If, as in this case, he is sued and his
home attached by his own attorney, who is
representing him in another matter, all
feelings of loyalty are necessarily destroyed, and the profession is exposed to
the charge that it is interested only in
money.
The almost complete absence of authority
governing a situation where, as in the
present case, the lawyer is still representing the client whom he sues clearly indicates to us that the common understanding
and the common conscience of the Bar is in
accord with our holding that such a suit
constitutes a reprehensible breach of
loyalty and a violation of the preamble
to the canons of professional ethics.
Id.
at 84-85.
In a case very similar to this one, In Re Kushinsky, 247
A.2d 665 (N.J. 1968), the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld
the Bar Commission's finding that a lawyer who represented a
corporation suing a debtor and concurrently represented the
debtor in a charge of rape had violated the canons of ethics.
The Court stated:
The respondent argues before us that his
representing . . . Damon in the criminal case
were totally unrelated to his duties as attorney for Fencecraft in his actions against
Damon. While it is true that the . . . criminal action was unrelated to the actions of
Fencecraft against.
.Damon, the respondent
was under an obligation to devote his full
allegiance to his first client Fencecraft .
. It is self-evident that without the consent of Fencecraft the respondent could not
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fulfill his obligation as an adversary
to do all in his power to press Damon for
payment of the judgment, and at the same
time defend Damon against the criminal
charge. What would respondent's duties be
to Fencecraft if in representing Damon he
were to discover a previously undisclosed
asset? An attorney, in fairness to either
client, cannot be permitted to place himself in such an ambivalent situation. Id.
at 666.
Finally, the New Jersey Court noted that a lawyer must
have in mind not only the avoidance of a relation which obviously results in a conflict but must also consider the probability or even remote possibility that such a situation can
develop.
In Memphis and Shelby County Bar Association v. Sander~,

378 S.W.2d 173 (Tenn. App. 1963) a lawyer was disbarred

for many charges of impropriety, including the representation
of a woman suing her husband for a divorce while concurrently
representing the husband in a workman compensation claim.

The

lawyer insisted that the wife agreed that he could represent
her husband in the workman compensation claim.

But the court

stated that even if the testimony of the wife was entirely disregarded it would be clearly established by the testimony of
the lawyer himself that he acted improperly in representing
conflicting interests by accepting a retainer from the husband
after having accepted employment from the wife.
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sion was upheld by the New Jersey Court for the lawyer's representing a tavern owner in a criminal charge while concurrently representing the chief witness against the tavern owner
in an unrelated civil case.

The court again was concerned

with the appearance of impropriety in such a relationship and
stated:
Further, and perhaps even more importantly,
the impact on the public of Cohn's representation of both the State's principal
witness and the defendant in the revocation hearing would not be conducive to respect for law, order, and the judicial process. Public knowledge of those relationships could and probably would endanger,
at the least, a serious doubt about the integrity of the proceedings. Cohn's conduct in accepting Vincent as a client reveals a basic misconception of ethical
standards.
Id. at p. 7.
From these cases it is obvious that the fact that two matters are "unrelated" is not necessarily controlling.

Conflicts

or apparent conflicts are numerous in such situations.

Even

had Hansen fully documented and explained the potential problems
to both Mr. Burr and Kay Lou it is questionable whether they
would have the knowledge to understand such a conflict.
stated by the Supreme Court of Oregon:
The unsophisticated client, relying upon
the confidential relationship with his lawyer, may not be regarded as able to understand the ramifications of the conflict,
however much explained to him..
.The consent of both clients does not of itself
accord complete exoneration. Even if obtained after full disclosure, the consent
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As

does not relieve the attorney of searching
his conscience to discover any latent impropriety not readily perceptible to the
consenting layman.
In Re Bovin, 533 P.2d
171, 174 (Or. 1975) (Emphasis added).
There is no evidence of consent by either Burr or Kay Lou
except for Hansen's assertion.

Furthermore, Hansen never tes-

tified that he informed either Kay Lou or Burr as to the possible conflicts which could result from the dual representation.
He specifically stated that he did not inform Burr that his
conviction in the criminal case could be used to impeach him
in the civil case (Tr., p. 102) or that the trial of the civil
case following the criminal case could make Burr's position
worse.

(Tr., p. 131).

Hansen admitted at the hearing that it

was essential that he obtain the consent of Kay Lou and that
he failed to document such an important event because he "takes
people's word".

(Tr., pp. 82, 85).

For these reasons, the Bar Commission was justified in
finding that Hansen had violated the professional code of responsibility in representing both clients concurrently.
B.
The Bar Commission was Correct in Finding that Hansen
had Violated DR2-106 by Charging a Fee Not Based Upon Proper
Considerations, Including Costs, and Being Nonrefundable.
DR2-106 states that a lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive
fee.

A fee is clearly excessive when "After a review of the

facts a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee."
The rule then outlines factors to be considered as guides
in determining the reasonableness of a fee including the time
and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the question
involved, the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly, and likelihood that the employment will preclude other
employment by the lawyer, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services, the amount involved, the results obtained, the time limitations imposed by the client, the
nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client, the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer,
and whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
After careful review of the evidence the Hearing Committee
concluded that both the amount and structure of Hansen's fee
were improper and clearly excessive in light of the circunstances of this case.

The Hearing Committee and the Board of

Commissioners adopted the following findings and conclusions
concerning this violation:
(6)
That the respondent did indicate that he would take
the case only if Mrs. Behunin would immediately pay to him the
sum of $5,000. The respondent informed Mrs. Behunin that the
money would be retained regardless of whether or not the case
went to trial.
It is undisputed that Hansen requested and received the $5,0CO
fee within one week after the initial interview.

Kay Lou tes-

tified that Hansen told her the money would be retained whet~~
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it was settled out of court or whether the case went to court.
(Tr., pp. 16, 47).

(7)
That at the first meeting between respondent and Mrs.
Behunin, the respondent felt that he should file an answer and
a counterclaim, which he then did.
Other than requesting continuance of the trial date, no other pleadings were filed by
respondent.
It is undisputed that the only pleading filed in the civil action during the 1-1/2 years of representation was the Answer,
Counterclaim, and Cross-claim.

(Ex. 23).

It consists of four

pages.
(8)
That at the first meeting when the amount of the fee
was determined, the respondent felt that the lawsuit was in
the nature of a breach of contract requiring more factual accounting than legal preparation.
This finding is in accordance with Hansen's own testimony.
(Tr., p. 54).
(9)
That the initial meeting lasted approximately 10 to
15 minutes.
This fact was undisputed.
(10)
That Mrs. Behunin was not informed that no part of the
fee was refundable, even if Mr. Hansen was discharged. No contract of employment was ever signed by Kay Lou reducing the
terms of the employment to writing.
Kay Lou testified at the time of the initial meeting Hansen never informed her that the $5,000 fee was non-returnable regardless of what events transpired.

(Tr., pp. 17-18, 43).

No con-

tract of employment was ever signed by Kay Lou reducing such
terms to writing.

(Tr., p. 42).

Hansen agreed that no writing

~·;ists showing that such fee was nonrefundable,

(Tr., p. 67)
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but claimed throughout the proceeding that the nonrefundabilit.
was agreed upon by Kay Lou.
(11)
That the respondent at all times material to these
proceedings was of the opinion that the fee was not refundable.
Hansen testified to this during the hearing

(66,

it in his letter to the Bar and to Kay Lou.

67)

1

and statec

(Ex . 5 , 6 ) •

When

asked whether he thought a refund should be given to Kay Lou
at the time of the hearing he replied that he may have a moral
obligation to do so but he did not think it was a legal matter
or obligation and "I don't think that I should be dictated to
by the Bar or Kay Lou Wheeler as to how much that should be".
(Tr., p. 118, 126).

No refund has been made.

(13)
That during the period of time that the respondent
represented Mrs. Behunin in the civil action no depositions
were taken, nor was any other discovery taken by the respondent.
This fact is undisputed.
(14)
It was agreed between the respondent and Mrs. Behunin
that all out-of-pocket expenses incurred in the preparation of
the case would be paid by respondent out of the $5,000 paid by
Mrs. Behunin and further that the fee would remain the same regardless of the amount of time or effort expended by respondent in the preparation of the case or the result obtained.
Kay Lou testified that Hansen did not say anything about costs
but that she assumed that the $5,000 fee would be the total
cost and nothing else would be added.

(Tr., p. 47).

Hansen

testified that the $5,000 fee would include all expenses

.

1

inc~

Jc~

ing travel, meals, mileage, depositions, and other assistance.
(Tr., p. 56).
-44-
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Hansen testified that in setting the $5,000 fee he did
not consider the time required to be spent on the lawsuit.
(Tr., pp. 58, 117).

He likewise stated that the complexity of

the lawsuit was not taken into consideration except to the extent that it was in the District Court and did not look to be
anything out of the ordinary.

(Tr., pp. 58-59).

This fee

would be the same whether it took five minutes or five years,
win, lose, or draw.

(Tr., pp. 62, 128; Ex. 5).

(19)
That the Utah State Bar advised the respondent of
Mrs. Behunin's written complaint and the respondent then contacted Mrs. Behunin, at which time she requested that she would
like a portion of the fee returned to her and that she would retain other counsel, but that the respondent refused to refund
any portion of the fee previously paid and refused to withdraw
as counsel for Mrs. Behunin.

Kay Lou testified that after Hansen contacted her regarding the
Bar letter she went to his office and told him that she would
like to get other counsel and would like some of her money back.
She told him she would pay him for what he had done but thought
she had better obtain other legal assistance.

(Tr., p. 33).

She reiterated that at the meeting with Hansen she requested a
refund of her money less actual work done.

(Tr., pp. 41, 4 5) •

He told her to "think it over" as to his representation.

p. 33).

She then called Dean Sheffield and told him she did

not wish to talk to Hansen any further.
a.Jvised Hansen of her desire.
't

(Tr.,

(Ex. 7).

(Tr., p. 42).

Sheffield

In spite of her request

to deal with him further, Hansen "assumed" he was still her
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lawyer in a letter to her dateJ October 1.

(Ex.

5).

She did

not respond to this letter because Sheffield said she didn't
have to.

(Tr., p. 44).

(20)
That thereafter in February of 1977, Mrs. Behunin
again wrote to the respondent and advised him that new counsel
had been obtained and requested a refund of the fee, but that
the respondent again refused to make a refund of any portion
of the fee.
This letter is contained as Exhibit 15.

In that letter she sta-

ted, "I asked for a refund of my $5,000 less any convenience and
expense to you".

It is undisputed that Hansen has not refunded

Kay Lou any of her money as of the writing of this brief.
The Hearing Committee entered the following conclusion
based upon the findings:
3.
That the conduct of the respondent violated Rule IV,
Canon 2, DR2-106 for the following reasons:
(a)
The fee of $5,000 charged, collected and retain~
was clearly excessive and improper in that the fixing of said
fee by the respondent did not take into consideration all relevant circumstances, including the time required, the nature of
the case, the responsibility involved and the results obtained.
(b)
The fee was excessive and improper, since it
created a conflict of interest between the respondent and his
client, Mrs. Behunin in that after the payment of the fee by the
client it would be against the financial interests of the respon·
dent to incur any out-of-pocket expenses in preparation of the
case, i.e., the hiring of experts, including accountants, the
taking of depositions, and even travel.
(c)
The fee arrangement was excessive and improper,
since by virtue of being nonrefundable the client could not terminate the attorney-client relationship without suffering an
economic hardship.
In effect, the lawyer was no longer accountable to his client for the quality of his services or the propriety of his actions.
These conclusions were correct based upon the findings previously stated, other evidence in the trial, and law from otter
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According to the philosophy of Hansen all clients are at
arm's length status and any lawyer may ask any amount he so desires if a client is willing to pay it.

As he put it, "Some

lawyers get $100,000 for a lot less than I do for a lot less
money.

Some people charge a million dollar fee."

(Tr . , p • 13 6) .

If, indeed, Hansen were correct concerning the propriety of
a fee then there would certainly be no need for a canon specif ically prohibiting an "excessive" fee since any fee agreed to by
a client would necessarily be fair.

If such were the case the

criteria listed in DR2-106(B) would be unnecessary and no analysis of the facts would be required.

Obviously, this is not the

case and the fee of a lawyer cannot be equated to the "marketplace" of selling corn.

Ethical considerations as well as econo-

mic considerations must govern the setting of a lawyer's fee.
A brief analysis of Hansen's statements at the hearing
clearly shows both his attitude concerning fees and the impropriety of his actions.

When asked whether the fee took into ac-

count the time to be spent on the lawsuit Mr. Hansen replied
"No".

He likewise stated that the complexity of the lawsuit was

not taken into consideration except to the extent that it was in
District Court and it did not look to be anything out of the ordinary.

(Tr., pp. 58-59).

Hansen adamantly stated that time involved has no correlation to the amount of fee recovered and that if a case can be
oettled in 5 hours a thousand dollars an hour is reasonable.
<'I'r,

I

P•
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Obviously, Ransen's flat fee method produces cases where
he receives an enormous amount per hour and in other cases perhaps receives a very low amount per hour.

(Tr., p. 106).

Han-

sen did not recall ever telling Kay Lou that his method of computation of fees was materially different from that used in
the normal legal community.

(Tr . , p . l O6 ) .

In other words,

Hansen did not inform Kay Lou nor does he make it a practice to
inform his other clients of the gamble the client is taking by
hiring Hansen in a case where a very short number of hours may
dispose of the entire matter and in which Hansen may be fully
aware of its ripeness for quick disposal.
Hansen argues that neither the Hearing Committee nor the
Board of Commissioners can take it upon themselves to decide
what a reasonable fee would be under the circumstances without
any evidence.

(Appellant's brief, p. 41) .

Obviously, the evi-

dence in this case consisted of the agreement itself, the amount
of work which Hansen had already done, and the complexity of the
case as shown from the pleadings.

Members of the Hearing Com-

mittee, the Board of Commissioners, and this Court are all lawyers and in a disciplinary proceeding to determine a violation
of an ethical rule certainly qualify as lawyers "of ordinary
prudence" as defined in DR2-106(B).

The expression of Hansen

that the fee is for "five minutes or five years, win, lose, or
draw"

(Tr., p. 62)

shows a prudent lawyer that the elements cf

time and result are not considered in establishing the fee,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
cannot
meet the
criteria
established
Library Services
and Technology
Act, administered by the Utahunder
State Library. DR2-106.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-47-

3 ~-

Hansen argues that the Hearing Conunittee's conclusion that
paying out-of-pocket expenses from the initial retainer created
a conflict of interest was based upon pure speculation.
pellant's brief, pp. 31-32).

(Ap-

Hansen then argues that it is no

more subject to abuse than when an hourly rate is charged and
costs are separately added to the client's bill.

Hansen con-

tinues that in such a case an attorney may engage in "needless
discovery to obtain a free vacation to a warm climate in the
wintertime".

(Appellant's brief, p. 32).

Hansen ignores the fact that the custom of the legal community is to charge all clients costs in addition to the initial fee.

If a lawyer wishes to go to a warmer climate for a

vacation and charges his client he must at least be able to
justify it to the client.

Here, however, it is much easier for

Hansen not to do anything in the way of expenses since the client has no input as to what has or has not been done on the case.
This failure to expend money was no doubt taken into account by
the Trial Conunittee since no discovery was undertaken in this
case after 1-1/2 years.
The inclusion of costs in the initial fee charged by Hansen
also shows his failure to consider the factors necessary to properly evaluate a fee.

How can Hansen, for example, take into

consideration all the factors required by Disciplinary Rule 21% when he is not even aware of how much money will be deducted
:r~m

his fee because of litigation costs?
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Finally, the nonrefundable feature of Hansen's contract
is also objectionable and in violation of the ethical standards.
Hansen seems to believe that regardless of the outcome of a
case he is entitled to keep the retainer.
is erroneous for a number of reasons.

Hansen's assumption

First, a client such as

Kay Lou Pays the $5,000 fee on the assumption that a favorable
conclusion, either settlement or trial, will be achieved.

Han-

sen admits that a client pays this amount under this assumption.
(Tr., p. 116).

And while the client can hire another lawyer if

he becomes dissatisfied with Hansen the client can't get his
money back.

Consequently, unless the client is able to raise

the additional money for a new attorney, the client is forced
to "ride the case out" with Hansen regardless of his performance.
(Tr., p. 66).
The nonrefundability locks a client into Hansen.

As sta-

ted by Conclusion 3(c), "In effect, the lawyer was no longer
accountable to his client for the quality of his services or
the propriety of his actions".

Thus, a client who cannot af-

ford to donate his money to Hansen and then pay another lawyer
is forced to accept whatever representation Hansen decides to
give him.

Hansen can do as little or as much for the client as

Hansen desires--the client can only grin and bear it.
Hansen stated at the hearing that he does not think a refund is legally required regardless of his actions and he does
not like being told by the Bar what he can or cannot do.
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(Tr··

p. 118).

Hansen in his brief states, "As noted previously,

if a court found that appellants remained able to render the
contracted for service, he is entitled to the entire contract
price upon his wrongful discharge."

(Appellant's brief, p. 47).

Hansen is wrong in all respects concerning the legality
of his policy.

In Kimball v. Public Utility District No. 1 of

Douglas County, 391 P.2d 205

(Wash. 1964) lawyers were termina-

ted by their clients and claimed they were entitled to the full
amount initially agreed upon.

The Court stated that a client

at any time may terminate a lawyer "wantonly and without cause"
and that "If the attorney is discharged or prevented by the
client from completing the work or undertaking, the measure of
attorney damages is not the fee agreed upon for completion of
the task, but reasonable compensation for the professional services actually rendered."
Schoemann, 124 P.2d 21

Id. at 209.

See also Salopek v.

(Cal. 1942).

Cases in other jurisdictions clearly show that Hansen's
"market" theory is untenable and that Hansen's conduct and attitude are in clear violation of the professional code of conduct.

In In Re Greer, 380 P.2d 482

(Wash. 1963) the Supreme

Court of Washington stated that there can be no dispute between
any reasonable persons concerning fees for services not rendered.

The Court said:
Can an attorney conscientiously assert that
his years of study, his learning, his standing at the Bar, justify his payment for professional services where no services were

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-so-

performed? Or can it sensibly be argued
that money for costs should be kept when no
costs were incurred? Mere statement of the
proposition is in itself an answer.
By no
criteria known to us could the attorney be
permitted to keep either the contingent fee
on interest never recovered by him or cost
monies never expended by him.
To place the
stamp of approval on such transactions endorses the unconscionable.
Id. at 487.
A very analogous case to the present situation is Bushman
v. The State Bar of California, 522 P.2d 312

(Cal. 1974).

In

that case Bushman, the California attorney, was retained by a
wife for divorce and custody of a minor child.

At Bushman's

request the client signed a promissory note for $5,000 and
agreed to pay a retainer of not less than $60 an hour.

The

Court noted that the attorney did not produce any records to
substantiate his claim of 100 hours spent on the case and noted
that the other attorneys spent slightly more than five hours on
the case.
The Supreme Court of California concluded, "The fees charged, and those which Bushman attempted to collect, were excessive, overreaching, exorbitant, and unconscionable."
314.

Id. at

The Court stated, "Furthermore, there was no reasonable

relationship between the face amount of the note and the services actually rendered.

The note contained no provision for

its surrender in the event the actual services performed by
Bushman did not warrant a $5,000 fee."
The Supreme Court concluded with affirmance of the deferdant'
s bysuspension
for
one
year
by
"It
is appropriate
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to repeat the observation of this Court that the right to practice law 'is not a license to mulct the unfortunate'".
Finally, in Potenza v. Oneida County Bar Association, 287
N.Y.S.2d 138

(App. Div. N.Y. 1968) a lawyer was accused of

charging an exorbitant fee to a client whose husband was imprisoned.

According to the opinion the lawyer requested the

wife to give him $2,000 and he would accordingly obtain the release of her husband.

He claimed that he did extensive legal

research but as the Court found, "Curiously, however, he made
no notes of legal principles or authorities resulting from
such research, and submitted no brief at the hearing."

At the

hearing the defendant attorney obviously viewed a legal fee
much like Mr. Hansen; that is, any fee obtainable is fair.
The New York Court specifically rejected this theory and stated:
Respondent's thinking on the subject of legal fees is perhaps revealed by the testimony of another lawyer called by Potenza.
That attorney testified that he paid no attention to any schedule of fees--'If I'm
going to work for a man and he agrees on
how much to pay me, that ends the matter.'
The law, of course, is to the contrary.
Matter of Cohen, 169 App. Div. 544, 547,
155 N.Y.S. 517, 520, where it was said that
'It is no less improper for an attorney to
take advantage of his client's necessities
and inexperience to induce him to make a
contract in advance to pay an exorbitant
fee for service than it is to take advantage
of those necessities and that inexperience
to exact an unreasonable fee after the services have been rendered.'" Id. at 141.
In suspending the defendant for a one-year period the Court
stated:

"Charging an exorbitant fee grossly disproportionate
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to the services performed is misconduct that warrants disciplinary action."
Mr. Hansen's philosophy that legal fees are a fair-trade
item and that no consideration should be given to the situatioo
of the client, their familiarity with legal problems, or the
terrorizing situation they usually are found in does not comply with the Professional Code of Responsibility.

Stated by

the Supreme Court of the state of Nebraska, "In fixing fees it
should never be forgotten that the profession is a branch of
the administration of justice and not a mere money-getting
trade."

State v. Richards, 84 N.W.2d 136, 143

(Neb. 1957).

Hansen has clearly violated the letter and spirit of the
Utah Code of Responsibility.

When the services performed by

Hansen, the inexperience of Kay Lou in civil lawsuits, and Hansen's adamant refusal to legally refund any of the $5,000 are
all considered no other result can be reached.

Hansen's entire

fee scheme is questionable at best even for sophisticated clients who are willing to gamble upon the all-or-nothing approach
Hansen telieves is permissible.

But in the cases of uninformed

clients who are not aware of Hansen's unique "no-time-correlatio
method of billing, his "no-charge-for-costs" method, and his ·~
refund-no-matter-what-happens" system there can be no doubt tha'.
such a system is tantamount to fraudulent misrepresentation.
Hansen complains that an ex post facto application of sar
policy has been made to Hansen.

He states that prominent
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a~-

torneys throughout the United States often require a nonrefundable retainer before they will take a matter on for a new client.

(Appellant's brief, p. 48).

If this unsupported state-

ment is true then these "prominent" attorneys are also committing ethical violations.

No lawyer, no matter how prominent

he may be, can ethically justify a nonrefundable fee which in
effect pays the lawyer for work he has not done.
In the instant case Hansen has completely failed to meet
his burden in showing that his irregular fee agreement was fully
understood by Kay Lou and has failed to document in any way his
claim that Kay Lou fully understood the ramifications of his
unique billing system.
The Bar Commission was correct in finding that the billing
system of Hansen is unreasonable and in violation of the criteria used in determining a fair fee and also that the particular fee in this case is grossly excessive in light of the work
actually performed, and in Hansen's criteria for setting the fee.
POINT III
THE RECOMMENDATION THAT HANSEN BE SUSPENDED FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR ONE
YEAR IS REASONABLE.
Hansen argues in his brief that this case does not involve
dishonesty but merely a misunderstanding.

Furthermore, Hansen

argues, there is no evidence that any confidence was ever be:rayed or that the client was hurt in any way.

(Appellant's

rief, p. 44).
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While such argument may at first seem appealing a closer
examination shows that Hansen's conduct merited one-year suspension.

First, Hansen has practiced law since 1950 (Tr., p.

49) and has been the subject of other disciplinary proceedings
throughout the years.

(Hansen Depo., p. 14).

He is not a

young lawyer out of law school or a lawyer inexperienced as to
the customs in the community.

His testimony throughout the

proceeding shows his distaste for the so-called "pegboard"

la~

yers who go by the hour and use conventional fee arrangements.
It does not require a legal scholar to understand that
representing two clients simultaneously constitutes a serious
conflict of interest.

Even if it were assumed that Hansen ob-

tained the consent of Kay Lou and Burr this does not excuse him
from this dual representation in light of the circumstances of
this case.

When it is assumed, however, that no such consent

was given then the matter is even more serious.
Hansen as a lawyer was seriously compromised by representing both parties and his client's and the public's image of
law and lawyers could not be anything but seriously damaged.
As stated by the Nebraska Supreme Court, "An attorney should
not only avoid impropriety but should avoid the appearance of
impropriety."

State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Association v.

Richards, 84 N.W.2d 136

(Neb. 1957).

Hansen's charge that this conflict was created by a "trar·'
by the Bar is absurd.

(Appellant's brief, p.

46}.
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It was KJ.

the Bar, who desired to stop communication with Ransen.
p. 42) .

(Tr.,

If Hansen was so concerned about his continued repre-

sentation of Kay Lou after being notified she did not wish to
talk to him further, he should have asked the Bar to obtain
her permission for withdrawal or filed a request with the Court.
The only trap set was Hansen's desire for two fees--not the
action of the Bar.
The $5,000 is equally reprehensible.

Hansen charged Kay

Lou, an unsophisticated client, a fee which was not based upon
any evaluation of the factors necessary and required by the
ethical standards.

He then refused to refund her fee even

though her desire for his withdrawal as her counsel was caused
by his own actions and inaction.

Hansen thus attempted to force

Kay Lou to either maintain his services, conflict or not, or
lose her $5,000 fee.
This conduct is certainly no better than a lawyer who comingles a client's money with his own even though the client
suffers no monetary loss.

This Court has on numerous occasions

approved a one-year suspension for the mere act of co-mingling
funds with no other showing needed.

In Re Lund, 506 P.2d 1273

(Utah 1973); In Re Hughes, 534 P.2d 892

(Utah 1975)

Lawyers in other jurisdictions have been totally disbarred
from the practice of law for failing to refund a client's money,
In Re Hall, 118 P.2d 67
1

(Ariz. 1941), and for failure to file

'.vill timely, People vs. James, 502 P.2d 1105 (Colo. 1972).
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The Bar Commission could properly take into account the
attitude of appellant Hansen in its decision.
405 P.2d 343 (Utah 1965).

In Re Fullmer,

Hansen throughout the proceeding ne-

ver admitted any conflict existed between the two cases, never
admitted that a "misunderstanding" between himself and Kay Lou
existed but rather termed her as a liar (Tr., p. 77), never
agreed that he was legally obligated to pay Kay Lou a refund,
resented the Bar's interference with the amount of any refund
(Tr., p. 118), and continually stated that he did not have to
keep track of his time or his efforts for anybody.
It should also be remembered that after the initiation of
the complaint by Kay Lou, Hansen neither offered to withdraw
from the representation of Burr nor offered to refund Kay Lou
any of her money.

At the time of the hearing he had tried the

Burr case and still had not refunded any money to Kay Lou even
though he was no longer employed.

No refund has been made at

this writing.
The Utah State Bar Commission was certainly justified in
considering all these factors to merit a one-year suspension fM
Hansen.

In addition, the prosecutors in this case would request

that Hansen be ordered to give a full and complete accounting

c:

his services and the services rendered by his off ice to Kay Lou
and to refund his fee based upon the remaining funds not expended.

In the event Kay Lou is dissatisfied with such acccur·-

ing she could then seek recourse through the Utah State Bar or
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through her own independent court action.
Finally, Hansen should be ordered to pay the costs of the
proceedings incurred by the Utah State Bar in the prosecution
of this action.
CONCLUSION
Attorney Phil Hansen has not been denied due process of
law before the Utah State Bar Commission and its Committee.
Hansen was adequately apprised of the charges against him by
the letter of Kay Lou to the Bar and given ample opportunity to
attend the Screening Committee Hearing.

He chose not to attend,

however, and now complains that it was the Bar's fault for his
non attendance.
Hansen complains that he did not know the charges against
him concerning the conflict of interest in spite of the fact
he specifically alleged on numerous occasions the very affirmative defense to the charge which was made against him.

He also

claims surprise as to the charges of excessive fee even though
all facets of the fee were fairly examined prior to the hearing
and even though Hansen himself did not inquire from the Bar as to
any clarification of the charges.
facts,

In addition to all of these

Hansen did not object to any of the evidence introduced

at the Bar concerning either the conflict or the fee and cannot
now claim error.
The findings of the Bar Commission are amply supported by
he evidence and are not arbitrary or capricious.

Unquestionably
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Hansen undertook the defense of Kay Lou while simultaneously
representing her adversary, Ted Burr.

It was Hansen's burden

to show that this dual representation was proper.

Hansen could

not show with any evidence aside from his own statements that
Kay Lou consented to this representation and offered no testimony that either Kay Lou or Ted Burr were informed as to the
consequences of the representation.
There is also no doubt that Kay Lou paid to Hansen $5,000
to represent her and her company in the civil lawsuit.

Hansen's

computation of $5,000 was not based upon any time relevancy or
result factor but was a fee calculated to be paid regardless of
the time required or the result obtained.

In addition, Hansen's i

inclusion of costs in the fee was instrumental in his failure
to do any discovery or make any expenditures on behalf of Kay
Lou during the 1-1/2 years of his representation.

Finally, his

adamant refusal throughout the proceedings to refund Kay Lou
that portion of her money which he had not earned attempted to
force Kay Lou to continue to retain Hansen whether she desired
him or not.

Such a fee and structure is clearly in violation o'.,

legal ethical standards.
Finally, the recommendation of the Bar to suspend Hansen
from the practice of law for one year in Utah was reasonable.
It was reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances of :'>
case and was reasonable in light of other
ings against other lawyers.

discipli~ary

?rocee~-

Hansen should also be ordered t:
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give an accounting to Kay Lou and give her a refund in addition
to paying the Utah State Bar its costs of prosecution.
The Utah State Bar respectfully requests that its recommendation be adopted by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,

PHILLIP R. FISHLER
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

Prosecutors for the Utah State Bar
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